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Williamson (1985) and Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) observed that specific 
investments might explain integration.  Building on this idea, Grossman and Hart 
(1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) have developed models of one-shot relationships, 
to discuss how integration may impact the incentives to make relationship- and asset-
specific investments.  But, as Williamson (1985) points out, relationships where 
integration is considered tend to have recurrent transactions.  Reputation effects can 
therefore discipline the parties, enabling them to enter into a relational contract that 
improves the incentives.  This paper studies such a dynamic setting.  It aims to 
understand how the relational contract should be designed, and how the use of 
relational contracts may impact the choice of ownership structure and technology.   
It is shown that the optimal self-enforcing relational contract (Bull, 1987) pays what 
a party would get after renegotiations (the spot mode outcome), a one-step bonus, and 
a fixed transfer.  The two latter elements are due to Levin (2002), who derives the 
optimal relational contract in a setting where only one party invests, the outside 
options are invariant to investments and uncertain environmental variables, and the 
parties cannot renegotiate after a relational contract violation to capture gains from 
trade.  These restrictive assumptions are relaxed in my model. 
The difference between the payments specified by the relational contract and the 
outcome of renegotiations determines the temptation to renege after uncertainty is 
resolved in a given period.  To base a one-step bonus on the renegotiations outcome 
maximises the incentive effect of the relational contract for a given temptation to 
renege.  The fixed transfer is used to make the dynamic enforcement constraints for 
each manager equally binding, and it is paid to the manager with the worst spot 
incentives when the production technologies otherwise are identical.  If the managers 
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also have identical bargaining positions, no fixed transfer is necessary, and the one-
step bonus is simply paid to the manager who had the best results in that period.  The 
relational contract includes thus elements of both (non-linear) piece-rate schemes (e.g. 
Stiglitz, 1975) and rank-order tournaments (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). 
Having characterised the optimal contract, I take up the discussion from Halonen 
(2002) on how the introduction of a relational contract should affect the choice of 
ownership structure.  First, I follow Halonen’s assumption that ownership transfers 
cannot take place in the punishment path.  Her main result, that a bad ownership 
structure in the one-shot game is sometimes good in the repeated setting, can then be 
replicated.  But, because I allow for effort being only imperfectly observed, I get 
different predictions for when that should be the case.  I refute for example Halonen’s 
claim (in her propositions 3 to 5) that inelastic investments favour a change in 
ownership. 
Then I allow ownership to change hands in the punishment path, as in Baker, 
Gibbons and Murphy (2002).  This assumption might be more consistent with the 
assumption that the parties are free to choose ownership structure at the start of the 
relationship.  I show that it then cannot be good for the sustainment of a relational 
contract to switch to an ownership structure that implies worse spot incentives for one 
party (or one task), unless it improves the spot incentives of the other party (or another 
task).  This is of course also the case in the spot mode. 
We therefore have two predictions that are in direct conflict, depending on whether 
ownership transfers are allowed or not after contract violations.  One way to bridge 
these two predictions is to allow asymmetrical bargaining, so that the (regretful or 
humble) violator gets less of the gain from ownership transfers than the other (angry) 
manager.  Halonen’s main result will then hold for sufficiently asymmetrical 
bargaining powers also when ownership transfers are allowed.  I further argue that the 
result is relevant for the initial choice of technology, irrespective of what punishment 
strategy that is used.  A technology with higher mutual dependency can promote 
‘trust’, as the reputational capital becomes more important. 
Finally, I discuss how the form of the joint probability distribution might affect the 
choice of ownership.  Independent of punishment strategy, I show that strong positive 
correlation between the performance measurements of the two managers favours 
ownership structures with relatively equal spot incentives, when technologies 
otherwise are identical.  When performances are strongly negatively correlated, 
however, the managers should worry only about the sum of the spot incentives.  
Different joint probability distributions can in other words lead to very different 
predictions of ownership structure under a relational contract (while it has no impact 
on the choice of ownership in the spot mode when the managers are risk neutral). 
Although space does not permit me to do so, the framework in this paper can be 
used to replicate the results on asset ownership and relational contracting found in 
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002), hereafter BGM. The model can in fact be seen as 
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an extension of theirs, although the idea to it was independently developed.  It differs 
in that it allows investments by both managers to capture the benefits and costs of 
integration studied by Hart and Moore (1990), it uses continuous state variables 
making it better suited to discuss the properties of the optimal relational contract, and 
it allows for several punishment strategies.  As in BGM, the model opens for both 
over- and underinvestment, so that all ownership structures (also joint ownership) can 
be optimal both in the spot mode and under relational contracting. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In section 1, I develop the one-period model.  Self-
enforcing relational contracts are introduced in section 2.  The optimal contract is 
derived in section 3.  In section 4, I discuss the choice of ownership structure.  Finally, 
in section 5, I make some concluding remarks.  
1. The One-Period Model 
There are two productive risk-neutral players, Manager 1 and Manager 2.  At t = 0 
they make non-observable investments in human capital.  These investments are to 
some degree specific both to some future transaction with the other manager and to 
some assets owned by the managers.  When uncertainty is resolved, the two managers 
make some further non-contractible decision (e.g. to trade a particular good) at t = 1.  
It is impossible to contract ex ante on this ex-post decision, because the costs of 
writing fully specified contracts, or to have them enforced, are prohibitive (Grossman 
and Hart, 1986). 
With two underlying assets, a classical interpretation of the model would be that 
Manager 2 in combination with Asset 2 supplies an input to Manager 1, who with 
Asset 1 uses this input to produce output that is sold on the output market (Hart, 1995).  
The investments may stand for the development of competencies in manufacturing and 
marketing respectively.  In the strategy literature the success of a company is thought 
to depend critically upon such investments (see for example Prahalad and Hamel, 
1990).  An asset could for instance be a factory, a distribution network or a company 
name, and a manager could include the whole management team.  Asset ownership is 
defined as the right to deny other parties access to the asset (Hart and Moore, 1990). 
The benefits at t = 1 are observable to Managers 1 and 2 but not verifiable to a third 
party.  The benefits depend on the investments at t = 0 (e1 and e2), some stochastic 
variables (ε1 and ε2) and on whether the two parties choose to cooperate or not at  
t = 1.  In the case of no cooperation, the benefits will further depend on the ownership 
structure.  The outside option is worth more to a manager if she has access to assets.  
Whether cooperation has taken place or not is also observable to the two parties but 
not verifiable to outsiders. 
When they cooperate, assume that the value added of each manager is linear in 
effort 
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   θ1C = e1 + ε1 
   θ2C = e2 + ε2, 
where ej ≥ 0 and E[εj] = 0, for j ∈ {1,2}.  The probability density function for (ε1, ε2) 
is quasiconcave, taking its maximum value for (ε1, ε2) = (0, 0).  If the two parties 
choose not to cooperate, their benefits are reduced to 
   θ1NC = γ (θ1C; k) 
   θ2NC = µ (θ2C; k), 
where k ∈ K is an indicator of ownership structure.  These functions reflect what a 
manager can achieve without the other manager’s human capital, and without access 
to the assets owned by the other party.  With some degree of relationship- and asset 
specificity, θ1NC < θ1C and θ2NC < θ2C.  To assure a concave maximisation problem, 
assume γ '(⋅), µ'(⋅) ≥ 0 and γ ''(⋅), µ''(⋅) ≤ 0.  This formulation is general in the sense 
that marginal benefits from more effort can be both lower and higher than under 
cooperation (allowing for both under- and overinvestment).  For γ '(⋅), λ'(⋅) < 1 (under-
investment) non-cooperation is more costly when surplus is large, while for  
γ '(⋅), λ'(⋅) > 1 (overinvestment) non-cooperation is more costly when times are bad. 
As is becoming standard in the literature, assume a symmetrical Nash bargaining 
solution at t = 1.  That is, cooperation takes place after renegotiations, and the gains 
are split 50:50.  The risk-neutral managers then maximise 
   U1 = 21 E [ θ1C + θ1NC + θ2C − θ2NC ] − c1(e1) 
   U2 = 21 E [ θ1C − θ1NC + θ2C + θ2NC ] − c2(e2), 
where cj(ej) denotes manager j’s private costs at t = 0 (in t = 1 dollars).  cj'(⋅),  
cj''(⋅) > 0.   
Define functions for how much of her value added a manager gets to keep after 
negotiations: ϕ(θ1C; k) ≡ 21 (θ1C + γ(θ1C; k)) and ψ(θ2C; k) ≡ 21 (θ2C + µ(θ2C; k)).  These 
functions depend both on the parties’ bargaining powers (here assumed to be equal) 
and on their outside options.  In their general form they can accommodate any 
bargaining outcome.  The maximisation problems of the two managers for a given 
ownership structure k are then given by 
   e1  =  
1
Argmax
e
U1  =  
1
Argmax
e
{ E[ϕ(e1 + ε1; k)] − c1(e1) } (1a) 
   e2  =  
2
Argmax
e
U2  =  
2
Argmax
e
{ E[ψ(e2 + ε2; k)] − c2(e2) }. (1b) 
The incentives of the two managers in a spot mode, hereafter called their spot 
incentives, are given by E[ϕ'(e1 + ε1; k)] and E[ψ'(e2 + ε2; k)] respectively.  The 
derivatives, ϕ'(⋅) and ψ'(⋅), indicate what share a manager will be able to secure from a 
one-dollar increase in her value added.  ϕ'(⋅) (ψ'(⋅)) can therefore be interpreted as 
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Manager 1’s (2’s) bargaining position, with respect to marginal changes in her value 
added, θ1C.   
Given these incentive constraints, the parties should in a spot mode choose the 
ownership structure k that maximises the expected joint surplus 
   Ω (e1, e2)  =  e1 + e2 − c1(e1) − c2(e2),  (2) 
where e1 and e2 are given by (1a) and (1b). 
Three simplifying assumptions have been made.  First, that the value added under 
cooperation can be separated into two parts, where each part depends only on the 
investments by one of the managers.  Second, that investment levels and the stochastic 
variables enter the benefit functions additively.  And, third, that the value of the 
outside option is a function of the value that could have been created under 
cooperation.   
The first and third assumptions will allow the relational contract to be based on two 
variables only, each manager’s value added.  The second assumption simplifies the 
necessary constraints to assure that the optimisation problem for each manager is 
concave.  The assumptions are not necessary to derive the results in this paper, but 
they simplify the exposition and should help the reader interpret the model and its 
results.1 
2. Self-enforcing Relational Contracts 
Imagine that the cycle described in the previous section with investments, resolution 
of uncertainty, and decisions on cooperation is repeated in future periods.  For 
simplicity assume that the managers and the assets live forever (or die together at a 
random date) and that the effect of the current-period investments is independent of 
past investments.  There is a common positive discount rate, r, which is constant over 
all periods.  In this setting relational contracts on the observable but not verifiable 
variables θ1C, θ1NC, θ2C and θ2NC can be sustained, when the managers are sufficiently 
patient.   
Since θ1NC and θ2NC are functions of θ1C, θ2C and k, only the latter need to be 
included in the general formulation.  Let W1(θ1C, θ2C, k) be Manager 1’s share of the 
realised joint surplus as specified by the relational contract, while W2(θ1C, θ2C, k) is 
Manager 2’s share.  It turns out to be useful, however, to consider a manager’s share 
relative to what she would get in a spot mode.  Therefore write Manager 1’s share as 
  W1(θ1C, θ2C)  =  [ ϕ(θ1C) + θ2C − ψ(θ2C) ] + [ ω(θ1C, θ2C) + t ],  (3a) 
 
1 One could instead use the following general functions: θ1C(e1, e2, ε), θ2C(e1, e2, ε), θ1NC = γ(e1, ε; k), 
θ2NC = λ(e2, ε; k), ϕ(e1, e2, ε; k) = ½{θ1C(⋅) + θ2C(⋅) + γ(⋅) − µ(⋅)} and ψ(e1, e2, ε; k) = 21 {θ1C(⋅) + θ2C(⋅) + µ(⋅) − γ(⋅)}, where ε is a vector of uncertain variables and e1 and e2 are vectors of tasks.  The relational 
contract introduced in the next section must then depend on all four observable variables: θ1C, θ2C, θ1NC 
and θ2NC.  The main results are unchanged, and the proofs are straightforward extensions of the current 
ones, but the bonus payment rule will be more complicated to relate to. 
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where ω(θ1C, θ2C) and t (a fixed transfer) are positive when they specify payments 
from Manager 2 to Manager 1.  The index for ownership structure, k, is omitted to 
simplify notation.  The sum inside the first square brackets is what the manager would 
get in a spot mode.  With balancing budgets, Manager 2’s share is given by2 
  W2(θ1C, θ2C)  =  [ ψ(θ2C) + θ1C − ϕ(θ1C) ] − [ ω(θ1C, θ2C) + t ].  (3b) 
Since these payments are not enforced by an outside court, a manager could be 
tempted to renege on them.  The division of surplus in that period would then be 
decided by the parties’ respective bargaining positions (as in the spot mode).  Note 
that there is no risk of one of the parties honouring the relational contract while the 
other does not, since the two parties can write a verifiable contract on transactions in a 
given period once the uncertainty is resolved. 
Then there is the question of what will happen after a contract violation.  There are 
many possible scenarios, and no general consensus has been reached in the literature.  
One can for example imagine that the managers use grim-trigger strategies and 
continue in a spot mode - with or without an ownership transfer.  They can play some 
kind of tit-for-tat strategy.  Or they can require retributions before re-establishing the 
relational contract.  It turns out that the form of the optimal relational contract is 
independent of which of these assumptions that are made, while the choice of the 
ownership structure is not.  I will at this stage therefore use a general formulation that 
allows for all scenarios and come back to the different punishment alternatives when 
they become relevant (in section 4). 
For the managers to honour the relational contract after uncertainty is resolved, the 
following conditions must hold 
  − ω(θ1C, θ2C) − t  ≤  R1 − S1  (4a) 
  ω(θ1C, θ2C) + t  ≤  R2 − S2,  (4b) 
where Rj is the net expected discounted value of all future transactions to manager j, if 
the relational contract is honoured by both parties, and Sj is the net value she can 
expect from future periods if she chooses to renege.  To find a subgame-perfect 
equilibrium of the repeated game (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989) there are also 
some ex-ante constraints that must be satisfied.  In particular, both managers must be 
better off under the relational contract than in a spot mode, so the right-hand sides of 
(4a) and (4b) must be positive.  With the optimal contract derived in the next section, 
that will be a problem only in very extreme cases.  But in those extreme cases one 
 
2 Unlike in Holmstrom (1982), a relaxation of the budget-balancing constraint does not improve 
incentives, because contracts on the observed signals cannot be enforced by a third party.  See Che and 
Yoo (2001) for a discussion of optimal incentives for teams in a repeated setting when signals are 
verifiable.  Payment schemes where the managers ‘burn money’ are not renegotiation proof. 
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must exchange either (4a) or (4b) with the appropriate ex-ante constraint.  In this 
paper we restrict our attention to settings where that is not necessary.3 
Definition 1  A relational contract is self-enforcing if the strategies it specifies 
(investment levels, payments and punishment strategies) describe a sub-game perfect 
equilibrium of the repeated game. 
PROPOSITION 1  For a self-enforcing relational contract to implement (e1R, e2R), the 
following three conditions must be satisfied 4 
  e1R  =  
1
Argmax
e
{ E[ϕ(θ1C) + ω(θ1C, θ2C) | (e1, e2)] − c1(e1) } (IC1) 
  e2R  =  
2
Argmax
e
{ E[ψ(θ2C) − ω(θ1C, θ2C) | (e1, e2)] – c2(e2) } (IC2) 
  
),( 21
sup
CC θθ
ω(θ1C, θ2C)  − 
),( 21
inf
CC θθ
ω(θ1C, θ2C)  ≤  R – S.  (DE) 
Proof  The incentive constraints, (IC1) and (IC2), are the maximisation problems 
that the two managers solve for a given relational contract.  The dynamic-enforcement 
constraint (DE) is found by taking supremums in (4a) and (4b), so that they hold for 
all possible realisations of ε1 and ε2, and then summing the two inequalities, with R ≡ 
R1 + R2 and S ≡ S1 + S2. 
3. The Optimal Relational Contract 
Proposition 1 listed constraints a self-enforcing relational contract must satisfy. Under 
some settings (for example when the parties are very patient) many different classes 
of relational contracts may perform equally well in terms of expected joint surplus 
(achieving first-best), but in this section we are looking for the relational contract that 
is the most effective under more marginal settings.  
PROPOSITION 2  No self-enforcing relational contract can generate a higher joint 
surplus for a given interest rate than one paying what a manager would get in a spot 
mode, a fixed transfer, and a one-step bonus. 
 
3 Assuming punishment strategies 1 or 3 as defined in section 4, it can be shown that for r < ½, the 
ex-ante constraints are always satisfied, or no relational contract can be sustained.  But, an ex-ante 
constraint could be binding if the spot incentives for one manager are extremely bad while they are 
close to first-best for the other, the probability distribution is highly peaked (so that the one-step bonus 
is very effective), and the interest rate is very high.   
4 Proposition 1 can be seen as an extension of Levin’s (2002) theorem 3.  Levin studies a setting 
where only one party invests, the outside options are invariant to investments and uncertain 
environmental variables, and the parties cannot renegotiate after a relational contract violation to 
capture gains from trade in that period.  Again, note that the conditions in proposition 1 are necessary, 
but not always sufficient, as under some extreme conditions an ex-ante constraint may bind. 
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Proof  An optimal self-enforcing relational contract maximises the expected joint 
surplus, subject to (IC1), (IC2) and (DE).  Consider the first-order conditions for the 
two incentive constraints 
  [ ]{ } 0    )(),(  ),()(E 1121211
1
=−+∂
∂ ecee
e
CCC θθωθϕ  (FOC1) 
   [ ]{ } 0    )(),(e  ),()(E 2221212
2
=−−∂
∂ ece
e
CCC θθωθψ . (FOC2) 
Let λ1 and λ2 be the Lagrange multipliers on (FOC1) and (FOC2) respectively and 
f((θ1C, θ2C)|(e1, e2)) be the (quasiconcave) probability density function of the outcome, 
given the two managers’ investments.  Ignoring (DE), the marginal returns to 
increasing ω(θ1C, θ2C) are m(θ1C, θ2C) ≡ λ1 )(/)(1 ⋅⋅ ff e  – λ2 )(/)(2 ⋅⋅ ff e .  For m(⋅) > 0, ω(⋅) should be chosen as large as possible, while for m(⋅) < 0, ω(⋅) should be chosen as 
small as possible.  When (DE) binds, the range of values ω(⋅) can take is limited.  This 
bang-bang solution can be interpreted as a bonus payment, which is paid by Manager 
2 to Manager 1 when m(⋅) > 0, and vice versa.  According to the set-up of the 
problem, see (3a) and (3b), the relational contract includes then payments identical to 
what the managers would get after renegotiations.  With (DE) satisfied, some fixed 
transfer t must be chosen so that (4a) and (4b) hold.  Each manager’s maximisation 
problem is concave under the relational contract, so the solutions to (FOC1) and 
(FOC2) are solutions to the maximisation problems in (IC1) and (IC2). 
Proposition 2 is based on Levin’s (2002) theorem 6.  In Levin’s model, the optimal 
relational contract is simply a fixed transfer and a one-step bonus payment.  Here it 
includes payments identical to what the managers would get in a spot mode.  Such 
payments must be included when outside options depend on investments and 
uncertain variables that affect also the cooperative outcome.  They would also have to 
be included if that was not the case, as long as the parties are allowed to renegotiate 
after a relational contract violation to capture gains from trade in that period.  
Furthermore, the bonus payment depends now on the realisation of two variables, 
since there are two indicators of value added, while in Levin’s paper there is only one 
(as only one party invests).  Note that it is straightforward to show that proposition 2 
holds also in a multi-task environment (see footnote 1). 
The expected payments specified by the relational contract can be written as 
  E[W1(⋅)]  =  E[ϕ(θ1C) + θ2C – ψ(θ2C)] – 21 β + t + p(e1, e2)β  (5a) 
  E[W2(⋅)]  =  E[ψ(θ2C) + θ1C – ϕ(θ1C)] – 21 β – t + {1 – p(e1, e2)}β,  (5b) 
where p(e1, e2) is the probability that Manager 1 receives the bonus, β, implied by the 
optimal rule for bonus payment.  In other words, the starting point is that each 
manager receives what she would get in the spot mode.  Then some amount is 
deducted, ( 21 β – t) for Manager 1 and ( 21 β + t) for Manager 2.  The net total of these 
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deductions, β, is given to the manager who is entitled to the bonus.  The dynamic-
enforcement constraint (DE) is then simply given by β ≤  R – S. 
To help the reader understand how the actual payment of the one-step bonus is 
determined, imagine an environment where the error terms, ε1 and ε2, have a bivariate 
normal distribution.  Bonus payment is then decided by a straight line through  
(e1R, e2R) in a diagram with (θ1C, θ2C) on the axes, where e1R and e2R are the 
investment levels chosen under the relational contract, see figure 1.  When both 
manager would have underinvested in the spot mode, the line goes from south-west to 
north-east.  If the outcome (θ1C, θ2C) is to the north-west of this line (where m(⋅) < 0), 
the bonus is paid to Manager 2, while Manager 1 receives the bonus if the outcome 
(θ1C, θ2C) is to the south-east of the line (where m(⋅) > 0). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Examples of rules determining payment of one-step bonus 
Start with a line that is 45° on the axes (so that ∂p(e1, e2)/∂e1 = -∂p(e1, e2)/∂e2).  
When the incentive constraints for the two managers then are equally strict, so that  
λ1 = λ2, this line is in fact the optimal bonus payment rule.  When λ1 > λ2 (Manager 
1’s incentive constraint is the most costly) more can be gained in terms of joint 
surplus by strengthening Manager 1’s incentives, and the line should be steeper.  For 
λ2 = 0 (when Manager 2’s investments are first-best anyway) the line is vertical. 
Definition 2  The production technologies are symmetrical if the cost functions are 
identical, c1(e) = c2(e), and the probability density function for the error terms is 
symmetrical, g(ε1, ε2) = g(ε2, ε1) = g(−ε1, −ε2). 
e1R 
e2R 
θ1C 
θ2C 0)( =⋅m  
β to Manager 1 
β to Manager 2 
λ1 > λ2 
λ1 < λ2 
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Definition 3  The investment specificities of the two managers are identical for a 
given ownership structure when ϕ(x) = ψ(x) for all x. 
With symmetrical production technologies and identical investment specificities, 
bonus payments are decided by a 45° line going through the origin:   
PROPOSITION 3  With symmetrical production technologies and identical investment 
specificities, the bonus is paid to the manager who had the best (worst) results in that 
period, when the problem is one of underinvestment (overinvestment).   
The bonus part of the relational contract is here simply a rank-order tournament 
(Lazear and Rosen, 1981).  But note that while it is usually risk aversion that limits 
the size of the prize in the literature on tournaments, here the temptation to renege 
plays that role.   
PROPOSITION 4  With symmetrical production technologies, the fixed transfer, t, in 
the optimal relational contract is paid to the manager with the weakest (strongest) 
spot incentives, when the problem is one of underinvestment (overinvestment).    
Proof  With the relational contract given by proposition 2, the left hand sides of 
(4a) and (4b), after taking supremums, are given by ½β - t and ½β + t respectively.  
Assume they bind, and subtract the one from the other to get 
  2t = ( R2 − S2 ) − ( R1 − S1).  (6) 
For the rest of the proof a punishment strategy must be specified, and the full proof is 
omitted.  It does hold for all the scenarios listed in section 2.  Assuming a specific 
scenario, set in the proper expressions for Rj and Sj, and use the fact that the 
investment level a manager would have chosen in the spot mode must give her a 
higher payoff in that mode than the investment level under a relational contract.  
The intuition behind proposition 4 in the underinvestment case is as follows.  With 
identical cost functions, the manager with the weakest spot incentives will invest the 
least in the spot mode.  But under the relational contract we want the investment 
levels of the two parties to be equal (if possible), due to the identical convex cost 
functions.  The bonus scheme will thus be designed to provide the weakest manager 
(in terms of bargaining positions) with the strongest incentives.  If Manager 2 is the 
weakest, this is achieved by having a relatively flat line in figure 1 determine who is 
going to receive the bonus.  But the probability of getting the bonus will be the same, 
½.  The bonus does not provide any of the managers with higher expected payments, 
it works only at the margin.  And since the payments a manager may expect from the 
increased value added of the other manager will be the largest for the manager with 
the strongest spot incentives, the fixed payment must be paid to the manager with the 
weakest spot incentives for her not to want to renege on the contract. 
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(7) shows further that it is the manager who gains the least from a relational 
contract that gets the fixed transfer.  This is the manager with the weakest spot 
incentives.  But, she will still gain the least.  The relational contract is socially 
desirable in the sense that both managers gain from it, but it is not ‘social democratic’ 
in nature, as it amplifies any differences in payoff between the managers caused by 
hold-up in the first place. 
4. The Choice of Ownership Structure and Technology 
If the managers agree to use the relational contract derived above, they should choose 
the ownership structure (k ∈ K) as part of the following maximisation problem: 
   { } )()(   Max 221121k),p( , ececee −−+⋅β  
 s.t.    e1  =  
1
Argmax
e
{ E[ϕ(θ1C(e1+ε1; k))] + p(e1, e2)β − c1(e1) }, (IC1) 
 e2  =  
2
Argmax
e
{ E[ψ(θ2C(e2+ε2; k))] + (1-p(e1, e2))β – c2(e2) }, (IC2) 
 β  ≤  R – S, (DE) 
 and the p(⋅)-function satisfying constraints given by the 
  underlying joint probability distribution on (ε1, ε2). 
The key research question is to investigate under what circumstances the ownership 
structure supporting the relational contract should be different from the one that 
would have been optimal in a spot mode.  The choice of ownership structure changes 
the spot incentives, given by E[ϕ'(e1 + ε1; k)] and E[ψ'(e2 + ε2; k)].  This impacts the 
incentive constraints, IC1 and IC2.  And it may or may not impact the dynamic-
enforcement constraint, DE, depending on what punishment strategies we assume the 
managers play.   
In table 1, I list six alternative punishment strategies, of which, to my knowledge, 
four have been used in other papers on relational contracts and asset ownership.  In 
1A, used by Halonen (2002), the managers would simply continue in a spot 
bargaining mode after a contract violation, but due to high costs associated with the 
transfer of ownership rights, they are stuck in the ownership structure used under the 
relational contract.  1B is similar, but in this alternative, used by Baker, Gibbons and 
Murphy (2002), there are no costs associated with ownership transfers (as there are no 
costs associated with spot bargaining or the initial choice of ownership structure). 
Kvaloy (2002) suggests a carrot-and-stick (tit-for-tat) strategy, 2A, where there is 
no transaction at all for one period following a violation, after which the relational 
contract is re-established.  2B is a modification of that strategy, where an ownership 
transfer is allowed before (and after) the punishment period (as that can improve both 
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mangers’ surplus in the punishment period but does not require any trust in the form 
of a relational contract). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Punishment strategies 5 
Blonski and Spagnalo (2002) suggest a retribution strategy, 3A, where a manager 
requires a payment to re-establish the relational contract that equals (almost) what the 
manager who has reneged otherwise would gain (Rj - Sj if manager j is the violator).  
If retribution is not paid, they continue transacting in a spot mode.  But, the manager 
who has been cheated refuses to transfer ownership rights, even when that would have 
increased joint surplus in the punishment path.  It is questionable, however, whether 
such a threat is credible.  A violator can argue that she is not willing to pay the 
retribution and instead go for spot transactions in the future.  And then she can offer to 
bargain over an ownership transfer when that increases the joint surplus (Blonski and 
Spagnolo do allow renegotiations of strategies).  Following this logic, the maximum 
retribution payment must be based on a Sj that allows a transfer of ownership rights in 
the punishment path.  This alternative is denoted 3B. 
As the reader will have noted by now, I am partial to strategies that allow the 
transfer of ownership rights (the B alternatives), but I accept that no agreement has 
been reached and will therefore consider all alternatives.  Fortunately, it turns out that 
for the results I derive, the important distinction is whether the punishment strategy is 
of type A or B, and not whether they are of type 1, 2 or 3.   
4.1. No transfer of ownership rights in the punishment path 
Assumption A  The punishment strategies do not allow a transfer of ownership 
rights, or such a transfer is prohibitively costly. 
 
5 One could also imagine that a manager would become so angry with the other after a contract 
violation that she would not do any transaction at all in future periods (although she might accept a 
one-time transfer of ownership rights).  This alternative is theoretically identical to alternative 1 in the 
table, except that γ(θ1C; k) and µ(θ2C; k) replace ϕ(θ1C; k) and ψ(θ2C; k) in S, so that a relational contract 
is self-sustaining for a higher discount rate.  
1A. Spot bargaining, but no bargaining 
on ownership rights after violation 
2A. No transactions in one period, and 
relational contract is re-established 
3A. Retribution is paid, and relational 
contract is re-established (spot 
bargaining if no retribution) 
1B. As 1A, but allow ownership 
transfers in punishment path 
2B. As 2A, but allow ownership 
transfers in punishment path  
3B. As 3A, but allow ownership 
transfers in punishment path 
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PROPOSITION 5  Under assumption A, an ownership structure with weaker 
(stronger) spot incentives can sometimes sustain a better relational contract in the 
underinvestment (overinvestment) case.  This is only the case when the increased 
temptation to renege in a given period is dominated by the increased punishment in 
future periods, which becomes more likely with 
(a) a more sharply peaked probability distribution (making the bonus more 
effective), 
(b) a greater incentive problem in the spot mode due to hold-up,  
(c) more patient managers, and/or 
(d) less convex cost functions (making managers more responsive to incentives). 
Proof  Assume for the sake of the proof that ownership can be chosen in a marginal 
way, that the managers underinvest, and that they follow the strategies defined by 1A.  
Consider weakening Manager 1’s spot incentives, E[ϕ'(e1 + ε1; k)], while keeping 
Manager 2’s incentives constant.  To simplify exposition, the weakening of the spot 
incentives is assumed to be independent of investment levels.  Due to the envelope 
theorem, we can use the partial derivative of the Lagrangian (L) of the maximisation 
problem with respect to E[ϕ'(⋅)] to establish the result.  To find the derivative of  
S = {e1S + e2S − c1(e1S) − c2(e2S)}/r, use the first-order condition for Manager 1 in the 
spot mode, E[ϕ'(⋅)] = c'(e1S).  Differentiating, we may write ∂e1/∂E[ϕ'(⋅)] = 1/c''(e1S) 
by the inverse function theorem, and we have 
 ∂L / ∂E[ϕ'(⋅)] = λ1 - λ3
)(
)(1
1
1
S
S
erc"
ec'−
, 
where λ1, λ2 and λ3 are Lagrangian multiplicators for constraints IC1, IC2 and DE.  
For the optimal relational contract we know that ∂L / ∂β = 0.  Use this to find an 
expression for λ3.  Substitute and rearrange to get 
  ∂L / ∂E[ϕ'(e1 + ε1; k)] < 0  ⇔  )(
)(1
  )()(
1
1
1
21
2
1
S
S
RR erc''
ec'
e
p
e
p −<



∂
⋅∂−∂
⋅∂ −
λ
λ . (7) 
The left-hand side of the inequality is the change in bonus, β, necessary for the 
relational contract to generate the same joint surplus as before and can be interpreted 
as the increased temptation to renege.  The right-hand side is the decrease in the 
discounted value of joint surplus in the spot mode, S; the increased  punishment.  
When the inequality is satisfied, β can be set even higher, so that it generates more 
joint surplus (unless investments are already first best).  Results (a)-(d) follow from 
(7).  For (b), remember that c'(⋅) = E[ϕ'(⋅)] under spot governance.  The proof is 
identical for the 3A case, since S1 and S2 add up to the joint surplus under spot 
governance also then.  And, the proof is similar with strategies of type 2A.  r in (7) is 
then replaced by ½.     
In the spot governance mode one would never change to an ownership structure with 
worse spot incentives for one manager unless the incentives of the other manager 
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improve.  Proposition 5 shows therefore that under assumption A, one may choose a 
different ownership structure with a relational contract.  This insight was first 
established by Halonen (2002). 
The predictions in proposition 5 of when we would expect to observe other 
ownership structures differ, however, from those found in Halonen’s article.  
Prediction (a) was not relevant for Halonen, since she assumes away uncertainty.  The 
unambiguous prediction in (b) could not be made in Halonen’s model, as a worsening 
of the incentive problem due to hold-up affects both the temptation to renege and the 
punishment, while here only the punishment effect is relevant.  And, while Halonen 
(in her propositions 3-5) claims that a manager’s investments must be inelastic to her 
(marginal) surplus share for a different ownership structure to be chosen under the 
relational contract, I show in (d) that a different structure is more likely for a large 
∂e1S/∂E[ϕ'(⋅)].  These predictions are in direct conflict for large ranges of parametric 
settings.6  Again that is because elasticity is only important for the punishment here, 
while it also affects the temptation to renege in Halonen’s set-up.   
In other words, predictions are critically dependent on whether or not one allows 
for imperfect observation of investments (as the nature of the relational contract then 
changes).  In the real world one can, of course, hardly expect investments in human 
capital and competences to be perfectly observable. 
4.2. Allow transfers of ownership rights in the punishment path at no cost  
Assumption B  The punishment strategies allow transfers of ownership rights along 
the punishment path at no cost.  The parties share the extra surplus generated by such 
transfers 50:50. 
PROPOSITION 6  Under assumption B, if there is a general problem of 
underinvestment (overinvestment), the parties should never switch to an ownership 
structure that weakens (strengthens) one of the parties’ spot incentives, unless the 
spot incentives of the other party then are strengthened (weakened). 
Proof  Consider the underinvestment case.  Weakening Manager 1’s spot 
incentives, E[ϕ'(e1 + ε1; k)], while holding bonus payments and E[ψ'(e2 + ε2; k)] 
constant, will induce her to invest less (IC1).  This will in turn make the dynamic-
enforcement constraint (DE) stricter, since the expected joint surplus R decreases, 
while S is unchanged.  Similar for overinvestment.    
 
6 For a given cost function, e.g. c(e) = eν, elasticity may decrease in a parameter (ν), while 
∂e1S/∂E[ϕ'(⋅)] first increases and then decreases in the same parameter (when e1S is allowed to change).  
In this example ∂e1S/∂E[ϕ'(⋅)] is at its maximum for ν = 1.32 when E[ϕ'(⋅)] = 0.75, and it can be shown 
that ∂e1S/∂E[ϕ'(⋅)] has always its maximum for some ν < 2.  A different ownership structure will under 
certain circumstances therefore be chosen only when investments are elastic in my set-up, while they 
must be inelastic (ν > 2) in Halonen’s world. 
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When ownership can change hands in the punishment path, strong spot incentives are 
good under both relational and spot contracting if underinvestment is the general 
problem, while weak spot incentives are good in the overinvestment case.  This does 
not mean that one will always choose the same ownership structures for spot 
governance and relational contracting (see subsection 4.5), but there is a tendency in 
this direction.  The result is easily extended to a multi-task setting, where there is one 
incentive constraint for each task (see footnote 1): 
COROLLARY  Assume scenario B in a multi-task setting.  The parties should then 
never switch to an ownership structure that worsens the incentives a manager would 
have had for a task in the spot mode, unless her spot incentives, or the spot incentives 
of the other manager, are improved for some other task(s). 
If the problem is one of overinvestment for one task and underinvestment for another, 
a change in ownership should only be considered when it in the spot mode would 
have lead to less investments in the first task and/or more investments in the second. 
With our general model, proposition 6 does not rule out any ownership structure, 
because all structures (also joint ownership) are candidates for being the optimal one 
in the spot mode.  But if we were to assume more restrictively that marginal and 
absolute values move together, as in Hart and Moore (1990), joint ownership can 
never be optimal in the underinvestment case.  Proposition 5, on the other hand, 
showed that joint ownership could be optimal also then, when ownership cannot 
change hands after violations.   
4.3. Asymmetrical bargaining powers after a contract violation 
It may seem unsatisfactory that assumptions A and B lead to so different results.  One 
way to bridge the gap between the conflicting predictions could be to allow 
asymmetrical bargaining powers in the negotiations over ownership rights after 
contract violations.  One might argue (although we lack a rational explanation for 
this) that the (regretful or humble) violator would accept less than 50 percent of the 
extra surplus from an ownership transfer, while the other (angry) manager would 
require more.  Some support for such punishment behaviour can be found in 
experiments on ultimatum games (e.g. Roth et al., 1991) and power-to-take games 
(Bosman and Winden, 2002). 
Assumption C  The punishment strategies allow a cost-free transfer of ownership 
rights along the punishment path.  After bargaining, b ∈ [0, 1] of the extra surplus 
goes to the manager who has reneged.7 
 
7 Note that we still assume symmetrical bargaining power in future years, when the parties expect to 
cooperate again.  The extra payment for ownership transfers (or the discount if the cheater is the seller 
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PROPOSITION 7  When b is sufficiently large, one should never choose an ownership 
structure with worse spot incentives under assumption C (as in proposition 6).  But, 
with b sufficiently small, an ownership structure with worse spot incentives can be 
good for the relational contract (as in proposition 5). 
Proof  With assumption C and punishment scenario 1 or 3, S = [(1-2b)Ω(k=ρ) + 
2bΩ(k=σ)] / r, where Ω is the joint surplus in the spot mode and ρ and σ are the 
ownership structures under relational contracting and spot mode respectively.  It is 
then straightforward to show (using the same approach as in proposition 5) that a 
marginal worsening of the spot incentives cannot be good when 
 



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

 −
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
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e
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pMaxb λ
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But, if (8) is not satisfied, a change in ownership could be optimal. With punishment 
strategy 2, r in (8) is replaced by ½.   
With b = ½, assumptions B and C are identical, while assumptions A and C generate 
identical results when b = 0.  Allowing for asymmetrical bargaining powers after 
contract violations, we can thus replicate Halonen’s main result that bad ownership 
structures in the one-shot game is sometimes good for the relational contract, also in 
an environment where ownership transfers are allowed in the punishment path at no 
cost. 
4.4. The choice of technology 
Propositions 5 and 7 show that when transfers of ownership rights are costly, or 
bargaining powers are asymmetrical in the punishment path, the choice of ownership 
can impact the performance of a relational contract.  But the managers can do more 
than that.  When they begin their relationship by acquiring assets, they can sometimes 
choose between technologies with different degrees of specificity to influence spot 
incentives.  Assuming that later technology changes are prohibitively costly (or at 
least more costly than ownership transfers), this can add value: 
PROPOSITION 8  A technology with stronger (weaker) spot incentives can sometimes 
sustain a better relational contract in the underinvestment (overinvestment) case.  
That is only the case when the increased temptation to renege is dominated by the 
increased punishment (as in proposition 5). 
 
of the asset) should therefore be seen as a retribution.  After this retribution is paid, the parties are 
willing to trade with each other on equal terms again.  To assume that also future bargaining powers are 
affected is unproblematic, but does not lead to any interesting new insights (except that of course a 
relational contract then will be self-enforcing for a higher discount rate). 
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The choice of technology is probably mainly driven by its direct effect on 
productivity.  But the indirect incentive effect discussed here may still be important.  
And it can, in fact, provide a theoretical justification for the result found in many 
empirical studies that mutual dependence between exchange partners seems to 
promote trust (Bradach and Eccles, 1989).  
4.5. The form of the joint probability distribution 
Consider the three uniform joint probability distributions for ε1 and ε2 drawn in figure 
2.  Assume that the value of the probability density function is one for all 
combinations that are inside the square, diamond and circle respectively, and zero 
otherwise.  In case A the variables are independent of each other, and ε1 ≤ 1 and 
ε2 ≤ 1.  In case B, ε1 + ε2 ≤ 21 .  And in case C, ε12 + ε22 ≤ 1/π.  The form of 
the joint probability distribution affects the possible combinations of ∂p(⋅)/∂e1 and  
-∂p(⋅)/∂e2.  In the underinvestment case we want these derivatives to be as large as 
possible, to strengthen the incentives to invest.  In case A, the restrictions are simply 
∂p(⋅)/∂e1 ≤ 1 and -∂p(⋅)/∂e2 ≤ 1.  In case B they are ∂p(⋅)/∂e1 - ∂p(⋅)/∂e2 ≤ 2 .  And in 
case C, (∂p(⋅)/∂e1)2 + (∂p(⋅)/∂e2)2 ≤ 4/π. 
To further facilitate the discussion, assume a simple linear technology, where 
ϕ(θ1C) = ϕkθ1C and ψ(θ2C) = ψkθ2C, where ϕk, ψk ∈ (½, 1).  There are two assets.  
Consider three ownership structures, I1 where Manager 1 owns both assets 
(integration), I2 where Manager 2 owns the assets and NI where each manager owns 
one asset (non-integration).  Assume some symmetry, so that spot incentives are given 
by ϕI1 = ψI2 = κ , ϕI2 = ψI1 = κ , and ϕNI = ψNI = κ ; where κ >κ >κ .  Further, 
assume quadratic cost functions, c(ej) = ½ej2.  In the spot mode, the managers are then 
indifferent between the three ownership structures when 2(κ -½ 2κ ) = κ -½ 2κ +κ -
½ 2κ .  Denote the κ  that solves this equation κ~ . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Probability distributions for (ε1, ε2) 
But, that does not mean that the managers then are indifferent to the choice of 
ownership structure under relational contracting.  When κ =κ~ , the managers would in 
ε1 
ε2 
Case A 
ε1 
ε2 
Case B 
ε1 
ε2 
Case C 
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case A strictly prefer non-integration, because that ownership structure can sustain a 
better relational contract.  There is no way to use the bonus payment rule to transfer 
incentives from one manager to the other, and due to the convexity of the identical 
cost functions, the extra incentive strength is worth more when they start with the 
same spot incentives.8 
In case B one can shift the incentives over to the manager who does not own any 
assets one-to-one, by adjusting the bonus payment rule.  Symmetry is no longer 
important for the relational contract, and the managers should simply choose the 
ownership structure that maximises ϕ + ψ (for the range of parameters where such 
shifting of incentives is possible).  When κ =κ~ , the managers strictly prefer 
integration.9  Finally, in case C the managers are indifferent between non-integration 
and integration for κ =κ~  (as in the spot mode), because both the probability 
distribution and the cost functions are quadratic. 
The trade-off of providing one manager with very strong incentives at the cost of 
weakening the incentive strength for the other manager is illustrated in figure 3 for the 
three cases (with the maximum ∂p(⋅)/∂ejnormalised to one in each case).  It is 
indicated that case C represents the threshold probability distribution in this example, 
so that the result from case A holds for all probability distributions with trade-off 
curves outside case C in the diagram (when technologies otherwise are symmetrical). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Trade-offs between ∂p(⋅)/∂e1 and -∂p(⋅)/∂e2 
Next we investigate how correlation between ε1 and ε2 will impact the results.  In 
figure 4, case C is taken as the starting point, and the probability distribution is then 
stretched to capture correlation.  With positive correlation, a 45° bonus payment rule 
implies that ∂p(⋅)/∂e1 and -∂p(⋅)/∂e2 both are equal to the distance between a and d; 
 
8 With κ  = 0.90, κ = 0.60 and r = 0.25, Non-Integration dominates Integration for κ > 0.71 under 
spot governance and for κ > 0.62 under relational contracting in case A (given punishment scenario 
1B).  Non-Integration is thus almost always optimal when a relational contract is used in this example. 
9 In the general model, they should maximise E[ϕ'(e1 + ε1; k)] + E[ψ'(e2 + ε2; k)] in case B, when the 
problem is one of underinvestment (given that a further shifting of incentives is possible).  For the 
example given in footnote 8, Non-Integration now dominates Integration only for κ > 0.75.   
1
)(
e
p
∂
⋅∂  
2
)(
e
p
∂
⋅∂−  Case A 
Case B 
Case C 
Differences in spot incentives are more 
costly under relational contracting than 
under spot governance 
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likely ownership structure 
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while with a flat bonus payment rule, ∂p(⋅)/∂e1 is only equal to the distance between b 
and c, and ∂p(⋅)/∂e2 = 0.  In other words, the 45° bonus payment rule strengthens the 
incentives of both managers, compared to the flat one.  That is, however, not the case 
for negative correlation, where the trade-offs are closer to those of case B.  The 
differences are illustrated in the diagram to the right in figure 4 (where again the 
maximum ∂p(⋅)/∂ej is normalised to one).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Probability distributions and trade-offs between ∂p(⋅)/∂e1 and - ∂p(⋅)/∂e2 
As large differences in spot incentives become more costly the further away the trade-
off curves are from case C in the north-west direction, we can state the following 
proposition: 
PROPOSITION 9  With strong positive correlation between the performance 
variables of the two managers, but otherwise symmetrical technologies, we would 
expect to observe ownership structures with relatively equal bargaining positions 
(non-integration) more often under a relational contract.  With strong negative 
correlation, incentive strength can be shifted to another manager through the 
relational contract at a smaller cost, and we would expect to see asymmetrical 
ownership structures (integration) more often. 
As shown in footnotes 8 and 9, the effects of correlation on the predictions of 
ownership can be quite dramatic.   
In the examples we considered underinvestment problems, but proposition 8 is 
valid also when the problem is one of overinvestment.  Overinvestment is more 
typically the problem, however, in a multi-task setting where some tasks increase 
outside value but are unimportant for the value of transactions inside the relationship.  
As pointed out earlier, the model is easily extended to such an environment, although 
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space does not permit an exhaustive discussion here.  The results in Baker, Gibbons 
and Murphy (2002) can thus be replicated.10   
In BGM, by construction, one can always shift incentives from one task to another 
on a one-to-one basis, so their model is equivalent to case B here.  My set-up allows a 
more general treatment, and it is a straightforward extension of proposition 9 that 
positive correlation makes it costly to choose an ownership structure with a large 
difference between tasks in how distant spot incentives are from first-best.  
Introducing positive correlation in BGM’s example (see their figure II on page 64) 
would make integration a less likely ownership structure (as was the case in the 
example here). 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The optimal relational contract was derived and implications on the choice of 
ownership structure were discussed.  It was demonstrated that predictions depend 
critically on the punishment strategies and the nature of the uncertainty. 
Real-world managers may resort to simpler relational contracts than the one 
specified here, if they can be sustained.  This will impact the choice of ownership.  It 
can for instance be shown that the simplest contract imaginable, specifying that each 
manager is to receive her observed value added, favours ownership structures where 
the managers have similar bargaining positions (typically non-integration or joint 
ownership). 
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